I’ve noted over the past three days that Whitey Bulger’s lawyer J. W. Carney has to convince the Appeals Court that people in the U.S. Attorney’s in Boston at the time Judge Stearns worked there actually knew of Whitey Bulger and his criminal activity.
Jeremiah O’Sullivan, head of the Organized Crime Strike Force, worked there from 1973 to 1989, Bill Weld was appointed the U.S. Attorney in Boston in 1981 and headed that office until early 1986 when he became be head of the criminal division of the Justice Department in Washington, DC where he stayed until the end of March 1988. Robert Mueller, now director of the FBI, was head of the criminal division in the Boston office from 1982 to 1988; Judge Stearns was there from 1982 to 1990, as head of general crimes and then chief of the criminal division. It seems fair to say that as far as criminal matters were concerned, Mueller and Stearns were Weld’s top assistants.
J.W. Carney has already suggested the obvious that the public would believe that the top guys in the federal criminal prosecutor’s office in Boston from 1981 through 1986 would know something about the top criminals in the Boston area during that time. He suggests you could almost take judicial notice of this and infers that these prosecutors had to have known of some of Whitey’s actions and have discussed them. I suggested Carney had to do more than that. He had to show the public is justified in believing these men had specific knowledge of Whitey and his crimes.
I’d suggest Carney show that FBI Agent Morris testified that in 1979 O’Sullivan was told Whitey and Stevie Flemmi were FBI informants and asked not to indict them in a race fixing case. On December 5, 2002, O’Sullivan was asked about this at a congressional hearing. He admitted he was told this by the FBI. Several times he was asked whether back in 1979 he knew they were murderers. He responded yes.
Next I’d show that he filed an affidavit to do an electronic bug on the headquarters of Mafia under boss Gerry Angiulo. Two of the informants in that affidavit were Whitey and Stevie Flemmi. This operation was carried out from January to May of 1981 just after Bill Weld became U.S. attorney. During that operation conversations were intercepted showing the Mafia could get Whitey and others to kill people for them.
Weld said: “Jerry and I were very close. . . . And I met frequently with O’Sullivan, every week, as the case against the Angiulos was building.” The Aguilo case continued for over two years formulating the evidence and presenting it to the grand jury. The Anguilo gang was arrested on September 19, 1983. In the summer of 1985 their trial started. It lasted through the rest of the year until they were convicted by a jury on February 26,1986.
It’s fair to say Weld was in continuing contact with O’Sullivan during his tenure as Boston’s U.S. attorney. It’s likely the public would believe O’Sullivan briefed him on the evidence especially as it related to the top criminals and that Weld would have told his top staff about it.
The public would also know of Judge Mark Wolf’s 661 page memorandum and order as should the Appeals Court. On page 200 he states: “By 1984, Bulger and Flemmi were considered by the Boston law enforcement community to be “well known organized crime figures.” According to Wolf, AUSA Gary Crossen and two DEA agents Al Reilly and Steve Boeri “shared a genuine interest in investigating Flemmi and Bulger” but they feared involving the FBI in their attempt because they believed the targets would be tipped off by the FBI because they were its informants.
Wolf found that at that time it was Weld’s understanding that Whitey had served as a source for the Anguilo wiretap and the FBI was suspected of tipping Whitey off about the state police Lancaster Street investigation. Wolf noted: “‘Weld knew that his proecutors shared the DEA agents’ deep doubts about working with the FBI in any investigation of . . .[Whitey].”
For the rest of 1984 DEA and AUSA Crossen who was new to the U.S. attorney’s office worked on investigating Whitey. They readied papers to do a wiretap on him and on December 24, 1984, submitted an application for electronic surveillance naming Whitey as their top target. They could not have done this without Weld’s knowledge. Into the spring of 1985 they would continue this operation and resubmit applications to other judges for extensions all of which Weld had to approve.
Judge Wolf shows that there was much discussion and controversy over this because the FBI was opposed to it. At the time Judge Stearns was head of the criminal division. It would seem the public would have every reason to believe if the boss had one of his assistants doing electronic surveillance against Whitey then the head of his criminal division would know this.
O’Sullivan’s knowledge of Whitey, Weld’s knowledge, the targeting of him by Crossen, and the controversies surrounding these matters as set out in Judge Wolf’s findings clearly show that individuals in the Boston U.S. attorney’s office knew Whitey was an informant and was also a top organized crime figure.
There’s even more I’ll mention tomorrow.